INTRODUCTION
The Establishment Clause1 -and particularly the issue of gov ernment funding of religious education2 -is one of the murkiest areas 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.").
2.
See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 12.2.6.2, at 1007 (1997) (noting that the Supreme Court's decisions on government aid to religious elementary and secondary schools are often "difficult to reconcile").
of Supreme Court jurisprudence.3 The Supreme Court has acknowl edged as much,4 and the sharp divide in the Court's most recent forays into Establishment Clause territory illustrates the point that the cur rent jurisprudential standards allow for a broad range of interpreta tion. 5 There is some hope that the Supreme Court will provide further clarification of its Establishment Clause standard in the near future.6 For now, however, it appears that the dominant mode of Establish ment Clause analysis is the examination of a government program's 3. See, e.g., It is unlikely that the Supreme Court's adjudication of the school voucher issue will set tle the conduit-financing issue. School vouchers involve an element of individual, private choice that differs significantly from that in conduit financing. Whereas school vouchers in volve a concrete form of intervening private choice in the decisions of each individual stu dent and his or her family, the private choices of bond purchasers in a revenue bond issuance are more restricted. See infra Il.B; see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 841 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring):
The plurality bases its holding that actual diversion is permissible on Witters and Zobrest [ ci tation omitted). Those decisions, however, rested on a significant factual premise missing from this case, as well as from the majority of cases thus far considered by the Court involv ing Establishment Clause challenges to school-aid programs. Specifically, we decided Witters and Zobrest on the understanding that the aid was provided directly to the individual student who, in tum, made the choice of where to put that aid to use. (citation omitted}.
If the Court determines that school voucher programs are constitutional, therefore, this rul ing would not necessarily mean that programs with more limited forms of private choice are constitutional as well.
9. The Court has emphasized that this analysis cannot be conducted mechanically. See, e.g. , Tilton, 403 U.S. at 677 (plurality opinion) (stating that any Establishment Clause inquiry "must begin with the candid acknowledgment that there is no single constitutional caliper that can be used to measure the precise degree to which these three factors are present or absent").
10. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 835 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
11. County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 599-600 (1989).
12. As described in Section LB, infra, the Court has used the label of pervasive sectari anism to denote institutions in which sectarian and secular functions are so intertwined that the government cannot provide secular aid without simultaneously advancing the institu tion's religious agenda. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 680 (plurality opinion).
13. Generally, municipalities may issue bonds to finance improvements or projects that are beyond their current means. See generally 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Securities and Obliga tions § 11 (describing municipal bonds) [hereinafter Securities and Obligations]. The issuance of bonds must be authorized by state law. Id. § 50; see also id. § 75.
Revenue bonds may be distinguished from general obligation bonds in that, while gen eral obligation bonds pledge the full faith and credit of the issuing government branch, reve nue bonds are special obligations, secured only by the revenue generated by the sponsored project. Id. § 13 (describing general obligation and special obligation bonds). According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the majority of municipal issuances in the United States consists of revenue bonds. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL 15. See generally Public Securities and Obligations, supra note 13, § 50.
such as the promotion of higher education. 16 In such cases, the gov ernment agency (the "authority") serves as a conduit, issuing the bonds on behalf of a particular private entity and loaning the revenue from the issuance to the private entity to finance a specific project or improvement.17 The parties to this transaction typically appoint a third party as trustee to "monitor[] the institution's payments, credit worthiness, and compliance with terms of the loan,"18 thereby mini mizing the role of the issuing authority in the transaction.19 This fi nancing arrangement provides a distinct benefit to each party. Bond purchasers benefit because interest on certain municipal securities, in cluding revenue bonds, may be exempt from federal income taxation.20
Bond purchasers accept lower rates of return on the bonds due to this tax exemption21 and, therefore, a private entity may finance an im provement more cheaply than if the entity had borrowed from a pri vate financial institution.22 By creating these incentives for both bond purchasers and private entities, revenue bonds advance the legisla tively mandated agenda of the issuing authority and therefore benefit the state or local government.23 18. Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682, 687 . This loan may be funded by a completed bond sale, see, e.g. , Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp., 241 F.3d 501, 505 (6th Cir. 2001) (describing a revenue bond issuance in which proceeds from a completed bond sale were loaned to the private entity), or may consist of funds "borrowed" by an issu ing authority from the trustee, wherein the authority then transfers its interest in the loan to the trustee. See Steele, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 717. ; see also Lark & Groves, supra note 21, at 184 (stating that, at times, "the lower interest rate is vital to making a project financially feasible").
23. For example, the bond issuance in Lynn was issued by the Virginia College Building Authority, an agency created to "carry out the purposes of the Educational Facilities Authority Act." See Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 687 (citing Va. Code § 23-30.39 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Virginia General Assembly passed this Act in order to "enable institu tions for higher education in the Commonwealth to provide the facilities and structures Recent decisions from the Virginia Supreme Court and the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee illustrate the constitutional dilemma that arises when pervasively sectarian institutions participate in this sort of financing arrangement. Taxpayers in these states have challenged revenue bond issuances that benefit religious colleges and universities as a violation of the Establishment Clause's prohibition against laws "respecting an establishment of religion."24 In Lynn, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether Regent University ("Regent") was eligible to use proceeds generated from the Virginia College Building Authority's issuance of revenue bonds to finance construction projects on its campuses. After determining that Regent was a pervasively sectarian institution25 -in other words, that religion so infused Regent's curriculum that it was impossible for the govern ment to separate its secular and religious functions when distributing aid26 -the Virginia Supreme Court held that Regent could neverthe less participate in the revenue bond program without violating the Es tablishment Clause.27 The court reasoned that, given this conduit financing arrangement, any funds that Regent received were not gov ernment aid as such, that the program did not create an incentive for students to choose religious over secular education, and that Regent received government funds only as the result of bond purchasers' pri vate choices.28
The 173 (2001) . Johnson failed to meet this expectation, however, because the Sixth Circuit stressed that the school at issue in that case was a merely sectarian rather than a pervasively sectarian institution. Johnson, 241 F.3d at 510. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit expressed the belief that Hunt's prohibition against gov ernment aid to pervasively sectarian institutions via revenue bonds remained good law. Id. For factors informing the Sixth Circuit's determination that the school was merely sectarian, see id. at 516-17.
·
Steele v. In dustrial Development Board,3 0 the district court considered the constitutionality of a bond issuance benefiting David Lipscomb University ("Lipscomb"), an institution much like Regent in its inte gration of "Christian faith and practice with the pursuit of academic excellence."31 As in Lynn, the district court found that Lipscomb was pervasively sectarian.32 Unlike the Virginia Supreme Court, however, the district court held that the revenue bonds were a direct benefit from the state and, consequently, that the bond issuance had the im permissible effect of advancing religion.33
The only Supreme Court opinion to address this controversy di rectly appears, at first glance, to support the district court's conclusion in Steele. In Hunt v. McNair,34 the Supreme Court held that a revenue bond issuance benefiting a sectarian institution did not violate the Es tablishment Clause,35 but noted that conduit financing would have the effect of advancing religion when used to fund a loan for a pervasively sectarian institution.36 The underlying logic of Hunt, and the major constitutional concern of the pervasively sectarian standard, is that when a college is so sectarian in nature that its religious mission in fuses any otherwise secular activity, it is impossible for the govern ment to ensure that aid flows only to the institution's secular func tions.37 While Hunt's standard is unambiguous, the case may no longer be good law. In the almost thirty years since Hunt, the Supreme Court's approach to Establishment Clause issues, as well as its understanding of when the government may provide aid to religious institutions, has undergone dramatic transformation.38 In order to address the Lynn/Steele split, then, it is necessary to reconsider the constitutional ity of conduit-financing arrangements that benefit private, pervasively sectarian colleges in light of the Court's recent jurisprudence. Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an oth erwise substantially secular setting.
37. See, e.g., id. at 744 (noting that the issuance of revenue bonds would not support the school's religious functions because any projects funded through revenue bonds could not be used for religious purposes); id. at 749 (stating that the Act under which the bonds are is sued, as well as the Authority's rules and the College's proposal, all limit the government's aid to "the secular aspects of this liberal arts college").
See Section I.A. infra.
This Note argues that a government authority does not violate the Establishment Clause by issuing revenue bonds to finance a loan to a pervasively sectarian institution because such aid does not involve public funds, is neutrally available, and entails only a minimal and largely indirect relationship between the government and the perva sively sectarian institution.39 Part I argues that, although Hunt v. McNair once settled this issue, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have undermined two logical predicates of the pervasively sectarian test, thereby requiring courts to use pervasive sectarianism as a factor in the overall Establishment Clause determination rather than as a presumptive invalidation of government aid. Part II explains that revenue bond issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian institutions do not advance religion according to the Supreme Court's current stan dard. Finally, Part III examines the ultimate church-state relationship in conduit financing, and argues that because recipients of revenue bonds do not receive public funds as such and because the government has only a minimal role in the bond issue, any church-state relation ship arising from conduit financing arrangements does not rise to an unconstitutional level of entanglement. This Part also applies the en dorsement test to show that the only act of real constitutional signifi cance -the authority's approval of a revenue bond issuance that would benefit a pervasively sectarian institution -is not an endorse ment of religion. This Note concludes that the unique character of a revenue bond issuance allows pervasively sectarian institutions to par ticipate in this government activity without violating the Establish ment Clause.
I. T HE O NGOING E VOLUTION OF THE PERY AS IVEL Y SECT ARIAN

TEST
This Part contends that the constitutional validity of revenue bond issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian institutions is an open ques tion, despite a series of Supreme Court decisions that, at first glance, suggest the contrary. Section I.A outlines the basic constitutional prin ciples and the application of those principles through the pervasively sectarian standard in Ti lton v. Richardson,4 0 Hunt v. McNair,4 1 and 39. This argument assumes that any university benefiting from conduit financing re frains (or agrees to refrain) from engaging in discrimination that would raise a separate Fourteenth Amendment or human rights issue. See Dave Ahearn, Gay Rights Ruling May Break Impasse over Bond Issue fo r Georgetown U., BOND BUYER, Jan. 14, 1988, at 1 (re porting that Georgetown University's refusal to grant equal rights to gay student groups -a violation of a district human rights law -had impeded the approval of a revenue bond issu ance for the university's benefit).
40. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
413 U.S. 734 (1973).
Roemer v. Board of Public Works.42 This Section argues that the main impetus behind the pervasively sectarian standard is twofold: it de pends both on the presumption that an institution's religious functions are inseparable from its secular ones, and that actual diversion of gov ernment funds to religious indoctrination is always impermissible. Sec tion l.B contends that the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence since the "Tilton trilogy"43 has significantly undermined these predi cates for the pervasively sectarian standard by overruling the pre sumption that certain institutions will divert secular aid to religious purposes and by allowing the diversion of government aid in certain cases. Thus, according to the Supreme Court's current standard, the question is not whether the government may aid pervasively sectarian institutions but rather under what conditions the government may aid such institutions.
A. Diversion as the Root of the Pervasively Sectarian Inquiry
This Section explores the jurisprudential origins of the pervasively sectarian test, and argues that it is based on two prior assumptions: first, that the religious and secular functions of certain institutions are inseparable and, second, that actual diversion of government aid is impermissible in all circumstances. The pervasively sectarian test has its roots in the fundamental mandate of the First Amendment: that the government "shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig ion. "44 Justice Black, writing for the Supreme Court, elaborated upon this principle in an oft-quoted passage from Everson v. Board of Edu cation: the First Amendment means that a state cannot "pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over an other. ... No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to sup port any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice relig ion. "45 Notwithstanding the absolutist language of Everson, the Supreme Court has never held that all financial aid to religious institu tions violates the Establishment Clause.46 Rather, the "crucial ques tion" posed by the Establishment Clause is whether the primary effect The Supreme Court developed the pervasively sectarian standard as a shortcut to the ultimate constitutional question of whether gov ernment aid advances religion. Ti lton v. Richardson, which the Court decided on the same day in 1971 as Lemon v. Kurtzman,49 marked the first application of the pervasively sectarian standard to a government program aiding religious universities. In Ti lton, the Court considered the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, which provided federal grants and loans to colleges for the construction of academic facili ties.so Taxpayers in Connecticut challenged the distribution of federal aid under this statute because of the participation of four "church related" colleges and universities.s1 A plurality of the Court found that the Act advanced a purely secular purpose,s2 noting with approval that the Act itself required recipients to use federal funds for secular ends, and that past recipients were obligated to return the aid upon a finding that it had been diverted to religious uses.s3 In so holding, the plurality rejected the taxpayers' contention that the nature of the recipient uni versities was such that it would be impossible for government aid to serve a purely secular purpose -that "religion so permeate [ Two of the five federally finance d buildings involve d in this case are libraries. The District Court fo und that no classes had been conducted in either of these facilities and that no re strictions were imposed by the institutions on the books that they acquired. There is no evi dence to the contrary. The third building was a language laboratory at Albertus Magnus College. The evidence showe d that this facility was use d solely to assist students with their degree to which religion restricted academic freedom at the recipient universities.56 The plurality found that religion had not, in fact, "seep[ed] into the use of any of these facilities,"57 and that the schools allowed for a sufficient level of academic freedom.58
Several aspects of the Tilton analysis are significant in light of the Supreme Court's later Establishment Clause jurisprudence. First, the Court looked to the actual use of the federally financed buildings and rejected the validity of considering instead a "composite profile" of a sectarian institution.59 Second, the Court's inquiry into the religious character of the school was aimed at determining whether the school was so religious that the government could not ensure that secular aid remained secular once distributed to recipients. Thus, the key issue in the Court's analysis -and the focus of what the Court would later formulate as the pervasively sectarian test -was the theoretical sepa rability of religious and secular educational functions.60 Third, it is sig nificant that Tilton dismissed one of the arguments often made by op ponents of government aid to religious institutions: that aiding the secular functions of a religious college would indirectly advance its re ligious functions by freeing resources for use in religious education.
Tilton states that, where the government can directly aid a school's secular functions without simultaneously giving direct aid to its relig ious functions, it is of no consequence that this aid may provide inci dental benefit to the institution's religious functions.61 This conclusion follows logically from the principle that the Lemon/Agostini test looks only to the primary effect of government aid.62
While Tilton hinted at the relevance of pervasive sectarianism, Hunt v. McNair63 cemented the principle that the pervasively sectarian test may serve as a shortcut for the Lemon inquiry. In Hunt, the Court applied the pervasively sectarian test in order to determine whether pronunciation in modern foreign languages -a use which would seem peculiarly unrelated and unadaptable to religious indoctrination. Federal grants were also used to build a science building at Fairfield University and a music, drama, and arts building at Annhurst College.
56. Id. at 680-82 (plurality opinion).
57. Id. at 681 (plurality opinion). While the Supreme Court did not find that the partici pation of the "church-related colleges" violated the Establishment Clause, it did hold that the Act violated the First Amendment by limiting the government's interest -and thus the requirement that the federally financed facilities be used only for secular purposes -to a twenty-year period. Id. at 683. government aid -in this case, a loan financed by a revenue bond is suance -was likely to be diverted to the institution's religious func tions.64 Because the revenue bond issuance considered in Hunt was not yet complete at the time of litigation, the Court was unable to examine the college's actual use of the loan and had to consider only whether the recipient college was "oriented significantly towards sectarian rather than secular education."65 Justice Powell, writing for a maj ority of the Court, initially used Ti /ton's pervasively sectarian analysis as a prima facie test for the advancement prong of the Lemon analysis:
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing re ligion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mis sion or when it funds a s£ecifically religious activity in an otherwise sub stantially secular setting. 6
The Court concluded that neither the character of the recipient, the Baptist College at Charleston, nor Baptist College's likely use of the aid raised any constitutional concerns.67
Hunt expanded on Ti lton by applying the pervasively sectarian analysis to the entanglement prong of the Lemon test as well as to the advancement prong. The entanglement analysis, at least in its "ad ministrative entanglement" mode,68 begins with the same fundamental concern as the advancement analysis: the government may aid relig ious institutions only if those institutions refrain from using secular aid to indoctrinate students. The Court considered the degree to which the recipient college was sectarian in order to determine whether such diversion was likely.69 In the Court's view, "the degree of entangle ment . . . varies in large measure with the extent to which religion permeates the institution."70 As the Court had already stated in Lemon, certain religious schools cannot participate in government programs without an oversight mechanism to ensure that government aid is not diverted to religious indoctrination. ing favorably upon colleges and universities that hired faculty and ad mitted students without regard to religious affiliation.84 In addition, the Court considered whether religious activities such as chapel atten dance and prayer were mandatory, suggesting that a lack of compul sory religious exercises indicates that a school is merely sectarian rather than pervasively sectarian.85 Finally, the Court inquired into the recipient-university's "institutional autonomy," or the degree to which religious authority dominates the university's administration.86 Even in the Ti lton trilogy, mere affiliation with a religious order was not enough to justify a finding of pervasive sectarianism. Indeed, in Ti lton and Hunt, the Court noted that a religious authority governed the in stitutions in question but, due to the other factors in the analysis, this governance did not rise to the level of pervasive sectarianism.87 Relig ious governance appears to raise constitutional concerns only when it limits the field of academic inquiry, results in religious qualifications for admission to the academic community, or turns secular education into a vehicle for religious proselytization.88
According to the Supreme Court's analysis in Roemer, Hunt, and Ti lton, the presence of these factors indicates that the institution in question is so religious in orientation that its religious and secular 83. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 756 (plurality opinion); Tilton, 403 U.S. at 681-82 (plurality opinion) (finding that, although the four colleges in question had "certain religious restric tions on what could be taught," these policies were not enforced but were instead super seded by an "atmosphere of academic freedom"); see also Stephen V. 85. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755-56 (plurality opinion) (noting nonmandatory chapel and prayers in a" 'minuscule' percentage" of classes); Tilton, 403 U.S. at 682 (plurality opinion) (observing that mandatory attendance at chapel was an element of the appellants' "compos ite" institution but was not a requirement at the actual colleges and universities under consideration). 87. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743 (noting, inter alia, that members of the college's board of trus tees were elected by the South Carolina Baptist Convention); Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686 (plural ity opinion) (stating that each college in question was "governed by Catholic religious or ganizations").
88. See, e.g. , Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755-56 (plurality opinion); Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686-87 (plurality opinion). This principle is evident in the very definition of pervasive sectarianism, as it includes those universities where "a substantial portion of their functions are subsumed in the religious mission." Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743 (emphasis added).
functions are inseparable, pushing the college or university outside the realm of secular academics. As the Court recognized in its later Es tablishment Clause cases, underlying this concept of pervasive sectari anism is the presumption that such institutions will use secular aid, in tentionally or unintentionally, to support their sectarian activities.89 The preceding analysis suggests that this presumption is based on the more fundamental notion that such diversion is always impermissible under the Establishment Clause. Ti lton, Roemer, and Hunt, therefore, appear to offer a quick resolution to the present inquiry. If those deci sions reflect the current Court's Establishment Clause standard, per vasively sectarian institutions are prohibited from participating in revenue bond issuances. 93. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 802-03 (plurality opinion).
94. See, e.g. , id. at 810 (plurality opinion). and the role of "numerous private choices" in allocating this aid,95 ul timately holding that these two factors indicated the aid was neutral toward religion in the sense mandated by the First Amendment.96
More significantly, the plurality claimed that it was time for the Court to overrule certain presumptions that, although once well es tablished in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, had sub sequently eroded. The Mitchell plurality contended, first, that the rule against diversion97 of government aid "is inconsistent with [the Court's] more recent case law and is unworkable."98 When govern ment aid is secular in content and neutrally available,· the plurality viewed it as irrelevant to the constitutional analysis that recipients might divert that aid to religious education.99 Noting that the Court had already expressed a lack of concern for divertibility in Wi tters v.
Washington Department of Services fo r the Blind 1 00 and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 101 the plurality argued that, in any case, divertibility has no real connection to the core constitutional is sue:
A concern for divertibility, as opposed to improper content, is misplaced not only because it fails to explain why the sort of aid that we have al lowed is permissible, but also because it is boundless -enveloping all aid, no matter how trivial -and thus has only the most attenuated (if any) link to any realistic concern for preventing an "establishment of re ligion.
"1 0 2
The preceding analysis of the Ti lton trilogy suggests that, in re jecting any concern for divertibility, the Mitchell plurality thereby did away with any possible rationale for applying the pervasively sectarian test.103 The plurality indeed concluded that this test is outmoded,104 but gave four different reasons for its obsolescence. First, the plurality 95. See, e.g. , id. (plurality opinion) ("As a way of assuring neutrality, we have repeatedly considered whether any governmental aid that goes to a religious institution does so 'only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of individuals.' " (internal citations omitted)).
Id. at 829 (plurality opinion).
97. Diversion may be defined in this context as "the use of governmental aid to further a religious message." Id. at 821 (plurality opinion).
98. Id. at 820 (plurality opinion). 104. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 826 ("[T)here was a period when [pervasive sectarianism) mat tered, particularly if the pervasively sectarian school was a primary or secondary school. But that period is one that the Court should regret, and it is thankfully long past." (citation omit ted)). Freedman states that this claim "abandoned years of established precedent." Freed man, supra note 3, at 334. noted its relevance was "in sharp decline,"105 as the Court had not re lied on divertibility as a factor in rejecting an aid program since 1985.106 Second, the plurality argued that an aid recipient's religious proclivities are irrelevant to the constitutional analysis.107 That is, when the government advances its secular agenda with a program al locating aid on a neutral basis, "it is a mystery which view of religion the government has established, and thus a mystery what the constitu tional violation would be."108 Third, the plurality contended that the pervasively sectarian label is "offensive," as is judicial examination of an aid recipient's religious beliefs.109 In a final, related objection, the plurality argued that this categorization has a "shameful pedigree" of hostility toward Catholicism, concluding that a doctrine "born of big otry" no longer has a place in the Court's Establishment Clause juris prudence.110
The plurality's proposed mode of Establishment Clause analysis would mark a significant transition -or, for some commentators, a " . She notes that, while the Bowen Court determined that the statute in question was constitutional "on its face," id. at 841, the Court remanded the case for the district court to determine whether there was evidence of any actual diversion. This concern for actual diver sion rather than potential or likely diversion is central to Justice O'Connor's Establishment Clause analysis.
114. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 841 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
violates the Establishment Clause when the government provides a "direct subsidy," but may be permissible when the aid is "more akin to the government issuing a paycheck to an employee who, in tum, do nates a portion of that check to a religious institution. "115 Unlike Justice Souter, who argued in dissent that the assumptions underlying the pervasively sectarian standard have continuing rele vance, 116 Justice O'Connor rejected the presumption that certain re ligious schools will use government aid for religious purposes. She cited Agostini for the proposition that "it would be inappropriate to presume inculcation of religion; rather, plaintiffs raising an Establish ment Clause challenge must present evidence that the government aid in question has resulted in religious indoctrination."117 While Justice O'Connor did not thereby overrule the root of the pervasively sectar ian test -the belief that diversion is impermissible under all circum stances -her concurrence did reject one of the predicates for the test: the presumption that certain religiously affiliated institutions are in herently prone to diverting secular government aid to religious indoc trination.118
Mitchell points to se v eral factors in the Court's recent Establish ment Clause jurisprudence suggesting that an institution's pervasive sectarianism is only one factor for the Court to weigh in determining the constitutionality of government aid. Specifically, four trends in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence indicate the Ti lton tril ogy's approach to aid benefiting pervasively sectarian colleges and universities warrants a fresh look. 116. Justice Souter applies the pervasively sectarian standard, arguing that, where a school is unable to separate its religious teaching from secular education, "direct govern ment subsidies to such schools are prohibited because they will inevitably and impermissibly support religious indoctrination." Id. at 837 (Souter, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 858 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
118. See Lark, supra note 29. Lark argues that, although Justice O'Connor did not reject the pervasively sectarian inquiry 'entirely, "[s]he did, however, rej ect the presumption on which the analysis depends" -namely, that secular aid will be diverted to religious uses at particular schools. Id. at 9. He notes later, however, that Justice O'Connor may invalidate a program if she found evidence of diversion: Id. This prediction is in line with the analysis in Section I.A, which contends that the pervasively sectarian test depends not only on the pre sumption that diversion is inevitable but also on the principle that such diversion is always impermissible. Because Justice O'Connor does not reject this latter principle as well, her Mitchell concurrence does not completely undermine the pervasively sectarian test. A ma jority of the Court, therefore, currently supports some sort of pervasive sectarianism inquiry.
119. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 820 (plurality opinion); id. at 855-56 (O'Connor, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring).
Mitchell plurality as to the overall significance of Wi tters and Zobrest for the governing Establishment Clause test, both sides agree that Wi tters and Zobrest are, in fact, examples of permissible diversion of government aid.120 For Mitchell's plurality, a religious institution's sec tarian use of ostensibly secular aid is permissible when diverted aid is itself devoid of religious content and the government has allocated aid without regard for recipients' religious affiliation.121 The concurring Justices take a somewhat harder line, arguing that the Court approved the diversion of government aid in Wi tters and Zobrest only because " [a ]ny aid . . . that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients."122 Despite this difference, the plurality and the concur ring Justices both reject the rule "that all government aid that directly assists the educational function of religious schools is invalid."123
In dismissing this rule, even if this rejection was subject to a num ber of qualifications, the Court undermined one of the fundamental predicates of the pervasively sectarian test. As described in Section I.A, the Court's reluctance to aid pervasively sectarian institutions is rooted in the principle that government aid must not, under any cir cumstances, fund religious activities.124 It is this logic that supports the rule in Hunt "that no state aid at all go to institutions that are so 'per vasively sectarian' that secular activities cannot be separated from sec tarian ones, and ... that if secular activities can be separated out, they alone may be funded."125 The Court's finding that diversion does not violate the Establishment Clause in certain circumstances means, at least, that a court faced with a revenue bond issuance benefiting a per vasively sectarian institution must determine anew the extent to which that transaction satisfies the requirements of neutrality and private choice.
Second, the Court's recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence highlights the fact that there may be variations in the distribution of government aid that mitigate constitutional concerns. This attention to the particular form of aid is nothing new in the Court's Establishment 120. Mitchell's plurality makes this point as well. Id. at 820-21.
121. Id. at 820 ("So long as the governmental aid is not itself 'unsuitable for use in the public schools because of religious content' and eligibility for aid is determined in a constitu tionally permissible manner, any use of that aid to indoctrinate cannot be attributed to the government and is thus not of constitutional concern." (internal citation omitted)). that between a transfer similar to a "hypothetical salary donation," in which a gov ernment employee donates a portion of her paycheck to a religious in stitution, and "an impermissible 'direct subsidy,' " in which the gov ernment provides financial assistance directly to that religious institution.128 The former transaction, even when it results in indirect financial assistance to an institution's religious mission, passes consti tutional muster because a private individual, rather than the govern ment, has distributed government aid to that religious institution.129 Although Justices have described the relevance of the form of distri bution in different ways,130 the Court has consistently found that the manner in which government aid reaches the beneficiary may take on an important role in the constitutional analysis.
While the Court considered a revenue bond issuance in Hunt v. McNair, the Court did not rely on the indirectness of a loan funded by revenue bonds in that case to determine that the aid in question was consistent with the Establishment Clause. In a lengthy footnote, how ever, the Court noted that government aid through revenue bonds was fundamentally unlike a direct subsidy.131 The "only state aid," accord ing to the Court, is the initial "creation of an instrumentality" author ized to issue revenue bonds.132 Given the importance of the indirect 126. 330 U.S. 13 ,1 8 (1947) (noting that the aid in question is received by parents rather than parochial schools); see also 130. Justice Souter, dissenting in Mitchell, framed this distinction in terms of a di rect/indirect inquiry, which allows the Court to observe "distinctions between government schemes with individual beneficiaries and those whose beneficiaries in the first instance might be religious schools." Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 888 (Souter, J., dissenting). Mitchell's plurality, on the other hand, prefers to view the direct/indirect distinction in terms of private choice. Id. at 816 (plurality opinion). character of government aid in Zobrest and Wi tters, the "special"133 na ture of loans funded by an issuance of revenue bonds may warrant re newed consideration.
Third, the Court has undermined two presumptions that had pre viously shaped Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the perva sively sectarian standard in particular. The Court expressly recognized the demise of these presumptions in Agostini v. Felton.134 First, the Court discarded the assumption that the placement of government employees in parochial schools "inevitably results in the impermissible effect of state-sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic un ion between government and religion."135 At first glance, this state ment would seem to have little impact on the present analysis because the use of public employees by students at parochial schools is a dif ferent form of aid than a loan financed by tax-exempt revenue bonds.
A closer look at the Court's statement in Agostini suggests, however, that the Court is calling into question the validity of such presump tions in general. While the question posed in Agostini and Zobrest had to do with an individual's compliance with the terms of her employ ment, this question is related to the issue of whether an institution will abide by the terms of its loan. There is no clear reason why Agostini's evidentiary requirement should not extend to the latter as well as the former. In this sense, the Court's elimination of the "symbolic union" presumption has important repercussions, as the Court is now less willing to assume that diversion of secular aid funded by a revenue bond issuance will take place at a pervasively sectarian institution, and will instead require evidence to that effect.136 In addition, the Court rejected the rule "that all government aid that directly assists the educational function of religious schools is in valid. "137 This conclusion stemmed from two prior determinations. The Court decided that allowing a student to use neutrally available gov ernment aid, such as Zobrest's sign-language interpreter, at a religious school was "no different" from allowing a state employee to give a portion of her paycheck to a religious institution, given the intervening 133. Id. role of private choice in either case.138 The Court also determined that the presence of a government employee such as Zobrest's sign language interpreter on the grounds of a religious school supported neither the presumption. that the interpreter would indoctrinate the student by manipulating her role as an interpreter, nor the finding of a symbolic union between church and state.139 In effect, the Court con cluded that the First Amendment did not prevent a private individual from using secular, neutrally available government aid in the manner of her choice and that the Court could not presume, without evidence to the contrary, that a religious institution would take advantage of that individual's private choice to indoctrinate her. Although the pro vision of government aid therefore had the effect of facilitating relig ious education in some cases, it did so without violating the Estab lishment Clause.
Finally, the increasing importance of neutrality in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence suggests that the constitu tionality of revenue bond issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian institutions warrants a fresh look. In Justice O'Connor's words, the Court has "taken a more forgiving view of neutral government pro grams that make aid available generally without regard to the religious or nonreligious character of the recipient school. "140 Behind this "more forgiving view" is the rationale that, when the government makes a particular form of aid available to anyone regardless of his or her re at 809 (plurality opinion) ("In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to the State and indoctrination that is not, we have consistently turned to the principle of neu trality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to their religion.").
Id. (plurality opinion).
142. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1986) (finding that the program in question was generally available without regard to the sectarian or non sectarian character of the institution benefited).
143. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1997) (stating that Witters' logic with regard to the program's neutrality could be applied in Zobrest "with equal force").
144. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231-32 (noting that, like the aid approved in Zobrest, Title I remedial instructors are available to students "at whatever school they choose to attend"). 
II. A IDING R ELIGIOUS U NIVERSITIES W ITHOUT A DVANCING R ELIGION
This Part argues that revenue bond issues benefiting pervasively sectarian colleges possess the neutrality and intervening private choices that the Supreme Court has required in its recent Establish-145. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809 (describing the roles of neutrality and private choice in the Court's prior Establishment Clause cases).
146. Admittedly, the present inquiry presents an issue somewhat different than the Supreme Court's prior neutrality cases. In Zobrest, Witters, and Agostini, the government aid was neutrally available to individual students, regardless of what school each chose to attend. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3 (aid in the form of a sign language interpreter); Witters, 474 U.S. at 483 (aid in the form of vocational rehabilitation assistance); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209-10 (aid in the form of remedial instruction). In the case of conduit-financing transactions, the govern ment aid -revenue bonds -would be neutrally available to institutions, regardless of re ligious affiliation. The neutral availability of government aid must, therefore, have a some what different effect in determining the constitutionality of revenue bond issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian institutions. 149. As suggested by Section I.B, the Supreme Court has undermined the basis for de fining pervasively sectarian institutions as those institutions where diversion is likely or where government aid would create a symbolic union between church and state. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223-30. Therefore, a pervasively sectarian institution may now be de fined as an institution for which there is actual evidence that secular government aid would, in fact, subsidize religious indoctrination. ment Clause jurisprudence. Neutrality is at the heart of the effect prong of the Lemon/Agostini test150 and, as this Part shows, is relevant in several respects. Section II.A focuses on the neutral availability of conduit financing, highlighting the importance of this evenhandedness in the ultimate determination of constitutionality. Section 11.B consid ers the role of private choice in revenue bond issuances, arguing that the intervening choice of private bond purchasers, although limited in scope, is further indication that these transactions are in accord with the Court's current Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Finally, Sec tion 11.C contends that revenue bond issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian institutions do not create an incentive for individuals to un dergo religious indoctrination and, thus, that these transactions satisfy the definition-of-recipients prong of the Agostini test.
A. Revenue Bonds as Neutrally Available Government Aid
This Section argues that revenue bond issuances possess the neu trality that the Supreme Court has emphasized in its recent Establish ment Clause jurisprudence, an important factor in the ultimate deter mination that these issuances do not violate the Establishment Clause's limitation on church-state interaction. The manner in which the government distributes aid -and, in particular, the degree to which such distribution is neutral toward religion -is important be cause of its relevance to the more fundamental issue of whether the government has a role in any religious indoctrination that may occur at the recipient institution.151 When the Court determines that the government has distributed aid without considering recipients' relig ious affiliation, this finding supports the conclusion that religious in-150. The focus of this Part is the "effect" prong of the Agostini test. Supreme Court ju risprudence has shown that the "purpose" prong is so easily satisfied that it is of little conse quence in the Establishment Clause analysis. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 808 (plurality opinion) (explaining that the Supreme Court did not consider the "purpose" of the program in ques tion because plaintiffs did not challenge the District Court's holding that the program had a secular purpose); Witters, 474 U.S. at 485 ("Our analysis relating to the first prong of that test is simple: all parties concede the unmistakably secular purpose of the Washington pro gram."); see also Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 795 (2001) (noting that the purpose prong of the Lemon test often had "no effect").
In the case of conduit financing, the act under scrutiny would be that which created the Authority. Such acts typically have a clear secular purpose, such as the promotion and im provement of higher-education facilities within the state. See, e.g., Cal. Educ. Facilities Au th. v. Priest, 526 P.2d 513, 515 (Cal. 1974) (describing the purpose of the California Educational Facilities Authority Act as "providing private institutions of higher education within the state an additional means by which to expand, enlarge, and establish dormitory, academic, and related facilities, to finance such facilities, and to refinance existing facilities" (quoting Cal. Educ. Code § 30301 (currently codified as amended at Cal. Educ. Code § 94100 (West Supp. 2002))); Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 687 (describing Va. Code Ann. § 23-30.39).
151. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809 (plurality opinion) (discussing the "governmental indoc trination" prong of the Agostini test).
doctrination at the recipient institution does not result from govern ment action.152 "Neutrality" in this context refers to a specific form of neutrality: an "evenhandedness of distribution. "153 The Court's inquiry does not concern the degree to which the government aid is generally neutral toward religion but instead focuses on whether the govern ment allocates aid in a manner that is itself neutral toward religion.154 By making aid available to applicants with a variety of views, religious or otherwise, the government avoids advancing any particular view.155 Neutrality in this limited sense is a single factor for the Court to weigh along with the aid's other qualities.156
In its application of this neutrality standard, the Court has ap proved of government programs that offer aid to any applicant, of any religion, who meets purely secular criteria. In Wi tters v. Washington Department of Services fo r the Blind, 1 51 for example, the Court vali dated a state vocational assistance program that assisted individuals with visual handicaps in obtaining an education.158 The basic standard of eligibility for the state aid was a visual impairment; the selection of aid recipients, therefore, had nothing to do with religion. Similarly, in 152. Id. at 809-10 (plurality opinion).
153. Id. at 883 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10 (approving of a program "that distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'disabled' under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, without regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature' of the school the child attends").
154. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 883 (Souter, J., dissenting) The form of neutrality advocated by Justice Thomas in Mitchell is equality among secular and sectarian parties -a refusal to inquire into religious affiliation when distributing government aid. See id. at 809 ("[W]e have consistently turned to the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to their religion."). Moreover, Justice Thomas stressed in Mitchell that neutrality and private choice are typically necessary to ensure that no religious indoctrination may be attributed to the government. See, e.g. , id. at 811 (plural ity opinion) (contending that "private choices helped to ensure neutrality, and neutrality and private choices together eliminated any possible attribution to the government" in Zobrest). Thus, Professor Chemerinsky's fear that, under Justice Thomas's Mitchell standard, "a school could begin each day with a prayer so long as every religion got its due," is un founded. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Why the Rehnquist Court ls Wrong About the Establish ment Clause, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 221, 227 (2001). By requiring a period of religious reflec tion, this practice is not neutral toward secular or areligious interests, as Mitchell requires.
155. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809-10 (plurality opinion) ("If the government is offering assis tance to recipients who provide, so to speak, a broad range of indoctrination, the govern ment itself is not thought responsible for any particular indoctrination.").
156. Id. at 2581 (Souter, J., dissenting). As this Section stresses, facial neutrality is only one consideration in the Court's multi-layered analysis. A facially neutral program may still run afoul of the Establishment Clause by directly aiding an institution's religious functions (e.g., if a state or municipality made direct grants available to all universities -including pervasively sectarian universities such as Regent University and Lipscomb University) or by creating an excessive entanglement between church and state (e.g., if a loan agreement be tween a conduit issuer and a pervasively sectarian university gave the state the power to veto any award of tenure at the recipient university).
474 U.S. 481 (1986).
Id. at 482-83. (Vol. 100:1108
Agostini v. Felton, the Court found neutrality in a program that sent public school teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial edu cation.159 The Court noted that Title I, which created the program, made aid available to any child who lived in a low-income area and was unlikely to meet the state's educational performance standards.160 Again, religious affiliation was not a factor in the allocation of gov ernment aid.
Revenue bond issuances such as those in Lynn and Steele possess · the facial neutrality required by cases such as Wi tters and Agostini be cause the statutes authorizing revenue bond issuances allow for the in clusion of any private institution that can advance the conduit issuer's primary mission. In Lynn, for instance, the Educational Facilities Authority Act provided a loose standard of eligibility that did not sin gle out religious colleges and universities as being especially qualified for this form of government aid;161 quite the contrary, in fact, as the statute disfavored religious education.162 Similarly, the statute creating the issuing authority in Steele was so decidedly neutral that the plain tiffs did not bother to challenge its facial neutrality. 163 The possibility remains that, despite the facial neutrality of the statutes authorizing revenue bond issuances, a particular conduit is suer could distribute aid with a bias toward religious universities. This It is the intent of the legislature by the passage of this chapter to authorize the incorporation in the several mun icipalities in this state of public corporations to finance, acquire, own, lease, and/or dispose of properties to the end that such corporations may be able to maintain and increase employment opportunities, increase the production of agricultural commodi ties, and increase the quantity of housing available in affected municipalities by promoting industry, trade, commerce, tourism, and recreation, agricultural and housing construction by inducing by inducing [sic] manufacturing, industrial, governmental, educational, financial, service, commercial, recreational and agricultural enterprises to locate in or remain in this state and further the use and production of its agricultural products and natural resources, and to vest such corporations with all powers that may be necessary to enable them to ac complish such purposes.
Id. (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 7-53-102(a) (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
danger, inherent in any form of government aid, presents a different question from the constitutionality of such aid in principle. The Court's refusal to consider potential diversion of secular government aid to religious purposes suggests that the Court would likewise de cline to consider administrative bias absent a specific allegation to that effect.164 Any such bias would, of course, advance religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. The more pressing question is whether government aid violates the Establishment Clause when the govern ment allocates aid evenhandedly to both secular and religious institu tions. The facial neutrality of statutes authorizing such aid is one fac tor indicating that the government program does not contravene the Establishment Clause.
The neutrality of statutes authorizing conduit issuances is no su perficial matter. It is evidence of the very rationale behind the legisla tive creation of such programs. This point is most obvious when one examines the revenue bond issuance from the perspective of the is suer.165 In most cases, the state creates the conduit issuer to further a particular secular purpose.166 The conduit issuer then offers to finance appropriate projects at any institution willing to aid the government in achieving its goal. When financing through the conduit issuer is avail able to all institutions, secular or religious, each resulting loan ar rangement between the issuer and the benefiting institution will have the effect of promoting the government's secular purpose. The aid is neutral in the sense that it uses all qualifying private volunteers to fur ther an overriding -and secular -government objective.
When the recipient institution is pervasively sectarian, however, the question arises whether aid is still neutral when it has the concomi tant effect of advancing the recipient's religious agenda. This is the main charge of those who oppose revenue bond issuances that benefit religious institutions: that a facially neutral statute is decidedly not neutral when its aid lends direct support to religious activities.167 The immediate flaw with this argument is that it conflates one kind of neu trality with another. As noted above, the issue under the government indoctrination prong of the Lemon/Agostini test is not whether the government aid is neutral toward religion in general but whether it is 164. See, e.g., Roemer v. Bd. Of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 761 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("It has not been the Court's practice, in considering facial challenges to statutes of this kind, to strike them down in anticipation that particular applications may result in unconstitu tional use of funds."). 166. With the bond issue under consideration here, that purpose is likely to be the pro motion of higher education within the state.
167. See, e.g., Steele, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 716. neutral toward applicants.168 The statute's overall neutrality toward religion is the issue of ultimate constitutional concern and, as such, cannot be settled with a single prong of the multi-prong Lemon/Agostini test. The Court uses this more narrow form of neu trality in determining whether it may reasonably attribute religious in doctrination to the government.
Besides this confusion about the meaning of neutrality, this argu ment fails to account for the fact that the Court has permitted aid that does, in fact, advance religion in some way. For example, while the Court has prohibited the government from directly advancing the re ligious mission of sectarian institutions, 169 it has not extended this pro hibition to indirect aid.170 Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected the idea that such a broad proscription is even possible.171 After all, Everson v. Board of Education held in 1947 that the First Amendment did not prohibit a board of education from reimbursing parents of children attending private schools for bus transportation costs.172 The Court reasoned that the state must at least permit religious institutions to benefit from public services such as police and fire protection that are available to all.173 While "cutting off church schools from these services" would guarantee that the state had absolutely no role in the persistence of religious activities,174 the Court concluded that the only 168. For a thorough overview of the different uses of the concept of "neutrality" in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, see Justice Souter's dissent in Mitchell. 530 U.S. at 878-84. He identifies three distinct uses of the term "neutral," corre sponding roughly to three phases in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. As originally used in Everson, "neutrality" was "a term for government in its required median position between aiding and handicapping religion." Id. at 879. Next, the Court used "neu trality" to identify aid that was secular, or nonreligious, in content. Id. at 880. In this sense, neutrality connotes not the optimal government position vis-a-vis religion but the nature of permissible government aid. Finally, neutrality came to mean to "evenhanded," or a distri bution of aid without regard to recipients' religious affiliation. Id. at 881 Justice Souter ar gues that the Mitchell plurality equates the third kind of neutrality with the first, improperly treating evenhandedness as a "stand-alone criterion." See id. at 883-84. neutral position for the state toward religion is to provide those public services that allow religious institutions to function on a minimal level.175 Anything less, the Court reasoned, would amount to hostility toward religion176 -an impermissible result under the First Amend ment. As indicated by Everson, the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause standard requires courts to ask not only whether government aid advances religion but how religion is advanced -and, more im portantly, what role the government plays in that advancement.
Admittedly, the Court placed greater emphasis on the character of the recipients of government aid in its Ti lton-era Establishment Clause jurisprudence, holding in Lemon, for example, that the government must limit aid to the beneficiary's "secular, neutral, or nonideological" functions.177 The rule that the government must aid the secular without advancing the religious functions explains the Court's prior concern with pervasive sectarianism, as the Court reasoned that the govern ment could not aid pervasively sectarian institutions without directly supporting their religious agenda.178 In recent opinions, however, the Court has focused less on the religious character of aid recipients and more on the neutral and indirect nature of government aid.179 In Wi t ters v. Washington Department of Services fo r the Blind,180 the Court approved aid that allowed an individual with a visual impairment to "study[] the Bible, ethics, speech, and church administration in order to equip himself for a career as a pastor, missionary, or youth direc tor. "181 The aid in Wi tters not only facilitated one individual's religious instruction but, in financing the aid recipient's seminary training, con tributed to the perpetuation of his religion.182 Nevertheless, the Court found that because the aid recipient chose to use "neutrally available state aid" to pay for his education at Inland Empire School of the Bi ble, it could not attribute the recipient's religious training to the gov ernment.183
Wi tters highlighted the fact that neutral availability is a single fac tor in the overall determination of whether the government has played 175. Id.; see also Nowck & Rotunda supra note 172, § 21.4 (describing the Everson ra tionale).
176. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 ("State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them."). 182. The petitioner in Witters was training "to become a pastor, missionary, or youth director," id. at 489, indicating that his intention was to disseminate or at least perpetuate his religious beliefs.
Id. at 489.
a role in religious indoctrination. Thus, when the government distrib utes aid without regard to the religious affiliation of potential benefi ciaries, this neutrality is one factor suggesting that the aid program is constitutional. Statutes empowering conduit issuers to issue revenue bonds on behalf of private entities possess this neutrality because they do not discriminate between potential recipients based on religious af filiation. This determination of facial neutrality is an initial step to ward the ultimate goal of deciding whether pervasively sectarian insti tutions' participation in conduit financing arrangements is neutral in the sense mandated by the Establishment Clause.
B. Bond Purchasers and Private Choice
This Section contends that, although revenue bond issuances limit bond purchasers to choosing only whether to buy bonds for a prede termined beneficiary, this narrow choice nevertheless supplies the element of private choice that the Supreme Court has required in its recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Court's private choice analysis focuses on the method through which the government allo cates aid to a particular institution. The Court has approved govern ment aid that is both neutral and distributed to religious institutions through the decisions of individual citizens, 184 thereby drawing a sharp distinction between aid programs that provide public funds directly to religious institutions185 and those programs that distribute aid to indi viduals who then -independently and privately -may decide to use that aid toward religious education.186 This rule is based on the ration ale that, when a government program allocates aid to an individual who is then free to use this aid in the setting of his or her choice, any religious indoctrination to which the individual is subject is not attrib utable to the government.187 These programs are an easy case, for both 186. See, e.g., Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3 (grants to disabled students); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at § 12.2.6.2 (describing the distinction between aid provided directly to an institution and aid distributed to students).
187. See, e.g. , Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 811 (plurality opinion) (describing the logic of the neutrality/private choice standard); Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3 (approving federal provision of a sign-language interpreter to a student at a Catholic high school); Witters, 474 U.S. at 483 (approving aid for a visually impaired student at a private, Christian college).
the neutrality of the government aid and the individual's role in de termining the ultimate destination of the government aid are clear.188
Programs in which the private choice played a subtler role have also passed constitutional muster. In Agostini v. Felton, 1 89 the Supreme Court considered Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which provided federal funds to "local educational agen cies. "190 These local agencie' s were to use this aid to finance remedial education and counseling programs.191 In its use of Title I funds, the Board of Education of the City of New York, a local educational agency, sent public teachers to religious schools to provide instruction in secular subjects.192 The Court found the role of private choice in this program "indistinguishable" from its role in the Zobrest and Wi tters programs: "Both programs make aid available only to eligible recipi ents. That aid is provided to students at whatever school they choose to attend."193 Agostini makes clear, then, that Wi tters and Zobrest do not stand for the proposition that private choice is present only when the government provides a benefit to an individual who then allocates that aid to the school of his choice. Rather, the private choice analysis requires courts to determine whether government aid runs to religious institutions as the result of individual choices -even if the institution then applies that aid collectively.194 As the plurality stated in Mitchell, private choice is most apparent when government aid is given directly to individuals who then allocate that aid to religious institutions, but "there is no reason why the Establishment Clause requires such a form."195
Lynn and Steele evince a sharp difference of opinion over whether government loans funded by revenue bonds involve an element of pri vate choice. In Lynn, the Virginia Supreme Court found private choice in the fact that all funds flowing to the recipient college were raised through the conduit issuance of revenue bonds, and, thus, con sisted entirely of the private assets of bond purchasers. The court rea soned that "[i]f no private investors purchase bonds issued on behalf 188. See, e.g., Zobrest, 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993); Witters, 474 U.S. at 488 (1985) ; see also Monsma, supra note 83, at 323 (identifying the neutrality/public choice combination as one of "two lines of legal reasoning" that the Court has utilized in approving government aid to sectarian institutions). of Regent, no funds flow to Regent."196 According to the Virginia Supreme Court's logic in Lynn, it is the intervening private choice of investors, rather than that of the government authority, that allocates government aid to the recipient institution.197 The court found that, because this decision concerns a potential investment, bond purchas ers are more likely to consider "market factors and personal circum stances" than religious considerations.198 In contrast, Steele rej ected al together the contention that bond purchasers contribute a private choice element to the constitutional analysis. For the district court, it is the Board (the conduit issuer) rather than the private investor who de termines which institutions may benefit from government-issued reve nue bonds.199 Unlike the petitioners in Zobrest and Witters, bond pur chasers "could not select which institution they wanted to receive the funds."200 In other words, a purchaser seeking to benefit from the tax free interest of revenue bonds is stuck with the recipient institutions selected by the conduit issuer. According to Steele's analysis, then, revenue bond transactions involve an intervening third party but fail to leave that party any meaningful choice in the allocation of aid.
Notwithstanding the district court's conclusion in Steele that the private choice of bond purchasers has limited significance for the con stitutional inquiry, this choice nevertheless fulfills an important role in the distribution of government aid. Indeed, the Virginia Supreme Court found in Lynn that, although the bond purchaser's private choice consists simply of deciding whether or not to purchase bonds issued on behalf of a particular institution, this restricted choice was enough for Establishment Clause purposes.201 A binary, "yes-or-no" choice differs in an obvious sense from the private choice of Zobrest and Witters, in which the government predetermines only the form of aid and allows individuals to distribute it to whom they choose. Never theless, the Lynn court found that this limited form of private choice is in accord with the logic of the private choice analysis,202 a conclusion that holds up when one considers the primary role of private choice in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Private 198. Id. at 699; see also DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, THE PRIVATE USE OF TAX-EXEMPT BONDS 74-75 (Urban Institute Press, 1991) ("Tax-exempt bonds are purchased primarily by households, commercial banks, property and casualty insurance companies, and open-end bond funds. All of these investors are motivated primarily by the tax-exempt interest. These investors tend to move in and out of the municiR�l bond market as their need for sheltering income from taxation rises and falls and the tax treatment of the interest income changes."). choice, according to the Mitchell plurality, prevents the government from "grant[ing] special favors that might lead to a religious estab lishment,"203 and counters any tendency for government programs to favor "pre-existing recipients."204 More fundamentally, private choice ensures that religious indoctrination is an individual rather than gov ernmental choice. 205 Given this understanding of the function of private choice, Lynn's binary choice fails in one respect. A yes-or-no choice clearly cannot allocate government aid (entitlement to benefit from a revenue bond issue) to those colleges and universities whose proposals have been rej ected by the conduit issuer. Aside from the usual market forces, then, bond purchasers' choices do not have the effect of redistributing aid. They can, however, achieve other important goals. These inter vening choices operate as a public check on the government, allowing investors to veto any attempt by the government to grant "special fa vors" to particular religious organizations.206 Moreover, the bond pur chasers' role undermines the appearance of government endorse ment,207 and, as the Virginia Supreme Court noted in Lynn, guarantees that no money is loaned to religious institutions unless private inves tors have consented -and have supplied the necessary funds. 208 Ultimately, investors' private choices are only relevant to the con stitutional analysis insofar as they distance the government from any religious indoctrination that may take place at a recipient institution,209 and, in this regard, the Court has looked to private choice and neutral availability together.210 In the case of revenue bond issuances, acts authorizing government authorities to release revenue bonds possess the facial neutrality called for by the Supreme Court's modern Estab lishment Clause jurisprudence. 211 The private choice of the bond pur chasers, although more narrow in scope than the private choice in Zobrest and Witters, is a check against government bias, ensuring that the government's role in allocating aid is not exclusive. Revenue bond issuances therefore include an important, though limited, element of private choice.
C. Neutral Distribution of Aid and In centive [Vol. 100:1108
This Section argues that, because any institution may benefit from a revenue bond issuance, this form of government aid does not create an incentive for students to undergo religious indoctrination. The Supreme Court examines the method by which an aid program defines its recipients in determining whether it violates the Establishment Clause.212 At first blush, this prong seems to ask the same question as the initial neutrality test. Indeed, the definition of recipients prong "looks to the same set of facts" as the neutrality test.213 This incentive inquiry, however, "uses those facts to answer a somewhat different question: whether the criteria for allowing the aid 'create[ s] a financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrination.' "214 The Court has ar ticulated an almost bright-line rule in this area: no incentive is present when the government allocates aid without concern for the religious affiliation of potential aid recipients.215
In applying thi' s rule, the Court has upheld aid programs that assist all eligible students at any school, religious or secular.216 In Agostini, for example, the Court concluded that the Board of Education's Title I services did not create an incentive for students to undertake relig ious indoctrination because Title I services were available to all chil dren "no matter what their religious beliefs or where they go to school."217 Similarly, the Court found no incentive in Wi tters because the government program did not provide any particular benefits to in dividuals who chose to attend a sectarian institution.218
The application of this rule to revenue bond issuances differs in some respects from its use in Zobrest,2 1 9 Wi tters,220 and Agostini.221 In
212.
See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997).
213. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 813 (plurality opinion); see also Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230-31 (noting that the criteria used to determine whether the recipient's use of government aid to indoctrinate could be attributed to the state are also pertinent to the issue of whether the program creates a "financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrination").
214. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 813 (plurality opinion) (quoting Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231 (al teration in original)).
215. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 231; see also Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 813 (plurality opinion) (de scribing Agostini's incentive analysis as a "rule"). Zobrest and Wi tters, the central issue was whether the government aid to the individual student created an incentive for the student to choose religious indoctrination at a sectarian school.222 Revenue bond issu ances benefiting religious universities require courts to consider in stead whether the government aid (a loan financed with revenue bonds) to the school creates an incentive for the student to choose the recipient school. The incentive analysis, therefore, asks the following in this case: Since revenue bond issuances allow benefiting universities to improve facilities, does this aid attract students to the university, thereby contributing to the indoctrination of students who would oth erwise have attended another university?
Lynn, applying the Agostini rule, found that the program did not create an incentive because it was open to "all qualifying institutions of higher education without regard to religious affiliation."223 The court reasoned that, because any university could take advantage of this special form of financing, there was no reason to believe that per vasively sectarian institutions were more likely to participate and therefore more likely to gain a competitive advantage (with cheaper loans) over nonsectarian institutions.224 This conclusion is in line with the Supreme Court's current standard. The Agostini rule looks only at whether the aid is neutrally available.225 That the aid may then benefit the recipient institution -and consequently make the university more attractive to potential students -is irrelevant to the Court's analysis. Because any university can finance construction and improvements in the same way, pervasively sectarian institutions have no particular competitive advantage. In short, the Agostini rule looks only at neu trality and statutes authorizing these conduit issuances neither favor nor disfavor religion.
III. THE LIMITED CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIP IN CONDUIT FINANCING
This Part contends that the ultimate relationship between a state or municipality and a religious university benefiting from a revenue bond-funded loan is so attenuated that, in light of the neutrality estab lished in Part II, such aid does not raise any legitimate Establishment Clause concerns. Section III.A argues that, because a loan funded by a revenue bond issuance does not include any public funds, the only government aid to the recipient institution is that the university -due to the tax exemption accorded to revenue bond purchasers -may fi nance an improvement at a lower cost than if that entity had obtained a private loan. This benefit, as well as the government's involvement in allocating and monitoring the benefit, is too indirect to constitute excessive entanglement. Section 111.B examines the church-state rela tionship in conduit bond issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian transactions through the lens of the endorsement test, demonstrating that an authority's decision to issue revenue bonds on behalf of a per vasively sectarian university is not an act of government endorse ment.226
A. Excessive En tanglement: Government Loans Without Public Funds
This Section demonstrates that the church-state relationship in conduit-financing arrangements involving pervasively sectarian uni versities is too attenuated to violate the excessive entanglement prong of the Agostini test. Generally, the excessive entanglement test calls for the Court to examine "the character and purposes of the institu tions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and religious authority."227 The Court's excessive entanglement inquiry concerns two distinct forms of entanglement: administrative and political entan glement.228 Administrative entanglement may be present where " [a] comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" is required to ensure that secular aid remains secular in effect.229 Political entanglement, on the other hand, is possible where government aid to religious institutions is likely to bring about "political division along religious lines. "230
As the Court acknowledged in Agostini, this entanglement inquiry has relaxed to some degree in recent Establishment Clause cases.231 "Administrative cooperation" and political divisiveness are now "in sufficient by themselves to create an 'excessive entanglement.' "232 Thus, even the need for the government to monitor the distribution and subsequent use of government aid in order to make certain that 226. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989) (describing the "endorsement" test).
227. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The first element of the excessive entanglement test, the nature of the institution, is a given for purposes of this Note: the universities at issue are so sectarian in nature that it is impossible for the government to aid only their secular fu nctions, despite the fact that any govern ment aid would be purely secular in content.235 Having determined the nature of the institutions likely to benefit from this government aid, it is possible to turn to the second element of the excessive entanglement inquiry: the nature of government aid involved in revenue bond issu ances. Justice Powell, writing for a majority in Hunt v. McNair, pro vided an apt description of the type of aid at issue:
STONE ET
The "state aid" involved in this case is of a very special sort. We have here no expenditure of public funds, either by grant or loan, no reim bursement by a State for expenditures made by a parochial school or college, and no extending or committing of a State's credit. Rather, the only state aid consists, not of financial assistance directly or indirectly which would implicate public fu nds or credit, but the creation of an in strumentality (the Authority) through which educational institutions may borrow funds on the basis of their own credit and the security of their own property upon more fa vorable interest terms than otherwise would be available. The Supreme Court of New Jersey characterized the assistance rendered an educational institution under an act generally similar to the South Carolina Act as merely being a "governmental service." The South Carolina Supreme Court, in the opinion below, described the role of the State as that of a "mere conduit."236 233. Id. a direct grant or subsidy but is instead derived from an exemption from a government-imposed burden. Admittedly, the difference be tween a loan funded by revenue bonds and a loan obtained on the pri vate market may be significant. According to one estimate, for exam ple, the revenue bond issue approved in Lynn saved Regent "about $30 million in interest over the 30-year life of the loan."242 Because this gain results from the government's consent to excuse private bond purchasers from a governmentally imposed loss, however, it cannot be equivalent to a direct grant or subsidy. Walz v. Tax Commission man dates this conclusion.243 In holding that the New York City Tax Com mission did not violate the First Amendment by granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, found a fundamental difference between exemptions from taxation and direct subsidies: "The grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the church support the state .... There is no genuine nexus between tax exemption and the establishment of religion."244 The gain realized by religious universities in revenue bond issuances is an even more indi rect economic benefit245 than that contemplated in Wa lz, as revenue bonds exempt the interest realized by the bond purchaser -and not the profit realized by the recipient university -from taxation.
Despite the clarity of Hunt and Wa lz, opponents of transactions such as those at issue in Lynn and Steele have attempted in various ways to characterize the government assistance in these cases as a form of direct aid. In Steele, the District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee supported its finding that loans funded by revenue bonds are a form of direct aid by arguing that the Supreme Court itself had recognized such aid as direct.246 The court contended that, in Rosenberger v. Rector of the Un iversity of Virginia,241 the Supreme Court cited Hunt "as one of the cases correctly cited by the Court of Appeals establishing 'the principle that we have recognized special Es tablishment Clause dangers where the government makes direct money payments to sectarian institutions.' "248 Given that the Court 242. Regent Press Release, supra note 22, at 1. 243. 397 U.S. 664 (1970); see also Lark, supra note 29, at 177 (predicting that the Mitchell plurality, if faced with the constitutional issue presented in cases such as Steele and Lynn, "would conclude that the program is an indirect tax exemption governed by Walz "). )). The passage from Rosenberger reads: "The Court of Appeals (and the dissent) are correct to extract from our decisions the principle expressly noted in Hunt that aid funded by a revenue bond issuance is not financial aid at all -direct or indirect249 -it is likely that the Court was stating in Rosenberger that Hunt, like Roemer and Tilton, recognizes the general principle that direct aid to sectarian institutions entails special Establishment Clause dangers.
Those opposed to bond issuances benefiting pervasively sectarian institutions have also attempted to raise a constitutional issue by dis regarding the significance of the revenue bond issuance itself. In Steele, for instance, the court found that the money received by Lipscomb through the bond issuance was, in essence, nothing more than a loan: "Lipscomb went to the Board in order to get a low interest government loan, and that is exactly what it received. "250 The bond issuance, in the court's analysis, was "simply the financing tool through which the government was able to collect funds sufficient to meet the $15,000,000 agreed to in the loan."25 1 Even assuming that the government aid consisted of the entire loan rather than only the dif ference between revenue bond-funded financing and private financing as suggested above, there is a flaw in the district court's characteriza tion. Because the substance of the loan, the money itself, came from private investors rather from than the government, the loan is not fr om the government. As the Supreme Court noted in Hunt, the gov ernment is a conduit in the loan transaction,252 channeling money from bond purchasers to the recipient entity. Although an entity such as Lipscomb may approach a government authority seeking a relatively low-cost loan, the authority was initially set up by the state legislature in order to promote and facilitate such transactions. A pervasively sec tarian university seeking a cost-effective method of financing an im provement can only approach a conduit issuer because the state legis lature initially made such an authority available for parties considering projects meeting the legislature's secular agenda. In this light, it is un reasonable to view the transaction solely as one that benefits the re cipient university; the authority -and thus the state -receives a de liberately sought-after benefit as well. 249. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 745 n.7 ("Rather, the only state aid consists, not of financial assistance directly or indirectly which would implicate public funds or credit, but the creation of an instrumentality .... ").
250. Steele, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 717. 251. Id.; see also id. at 720 (finding that the loan was a direct benefit to Lipscomb Uni versity because the government "chose to provide Lipscomb with low-interest financing through a loan agreement").
252. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 745 n.7 (noting with apparent approval that a lower court viewed the state's role in a revenue bond issuance "as that of a 'mere conduit' " (quoting Hunt v. McNair, 187 S.E.2d 645, 650 (S.C. 1972)).
Critics have also argued that the actual benefit received by a re cipient university as defined in the Hunt footnote -the difference be tween the revenue bond-financed loan and a private loan -is itself a form of direct aid because the state is deprived of the tax revenue it would have acquired had the university been forced to seek out pri vate sources of financial assistance.253 That is, due to the tax-free inter est on revenue bonds, the state loses revenue that would have been paid on the interest of a private loan.254 This position has little merit in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Walz v. Tax Commission.255 The Court ruled in Walz that a tax exemption is not a form of direct aid to religious organizations because an exemption only requires the government to refrain from imposing a burden on the church.256 Be cause no public funds are transferred in a loan funded by revenue bonds, the tax exemption is only an indirect economic benefit.257
Granted, the exemption in a revenue bond issuance differs from the exemption considered in Wa lz in two senses. A revenue bond issu ance requires a different sort of activity from the government. The government does not "simply abstain" from taxing the recipient insti tution but instead authorizes and structures a transaction having that effect.258 The difference between this authorization and the legislative action behind a tax exemption of the kind considered in Wa lz , how ever, is not great considering that both exemptions require explicit legislative authorization.259 Revenue bond issuances merely require one additional authorization -that of the authority empowered to is sue such bonds -before the administration of the transaction is 254. See id. at 6-7:
The issuance of tax-exempt revenue bonds ... for the benefit of a religious school is not an "indirect tax benefit," but instead is a direct subsidy in the form of substantially lower inter est payments on the loan. And this direct subsidy to the religious school is indeed paid for by "public funds" in the form of lost revenue to the (state J treasury from the non-tax-exempt in terest it would have received had the construction been financed by a commercial loan. turned over to other parties such as the trustee and underwriter.260 Second, revenue bond issuances differ from a tax exemption such as that evaluated in Wa lz because revenue bond issuances exempt the in terest gained by bond purchasers rather than any funds received by the religious institution itself. Any benefit derived by religious institu tions, however, stems directly from the tax exemption accorded to bond purchasers. The tax exemption therefore benefits the religious institution receiving a less expensive loan as much as it does the bond purchasers who directly benefit from the exemption -and only be cause of the exemption given to bond purchasers.
Some commentators have concluded that the government's indi rect aid via the issuance of revenue bonds directly assists the recipient institution in its religious mission because, in providing financial sup port to an institution's secular functions, this aid allows the institution to devote more of its financial resources to indoctrination.261 The Court has unfailingly rej ected this line of reasoning.262 Indeed, if the argument had any merit, the Court could never have approved aid to the secular functions of even merely sectarian schools, as any such aid would have the effect of leaving the school with more resources to spend on religious indoctrination.
As Hunt makes clear then,263 the nature of government aid in a revenue bond issuance is limited to the creation of the authority em powered to issue revenue bonds and the subsequent difference be tween the cost of a loan funded by revenue bonds and the likely cost of a private loan. This difference is attributable solely to the tax ex emption for interest received by bond purchasers and, according to Walz , a tax exemption is at best an indirect economic benefit.264
Under the fi nal element of the excessive entanglement analysis, it is necessary to consider the relationship between church and state that ensues from a revenue bond-funded loan. While a revenue bond issu ance clearly involves some degree of interaction between a pervasively sectarian institution and the government through the conduit issuer, church-state interaction qua church-state interaction does not neces- 262. See Roemer v. Bd. Of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating that, while the Court acknowledges that aiding a religious institution's secular func tions will free resources for "sectarian ends," the Court "never has held that religious activi ties must be discriminated against" by denying secular aid.); see also Tilton, 403 U.S. at 679 (plurality opinion) ("[B]us transportation, textbooks, and tax exemptions all gave aid in the sense that religious bodies would otherwise have been forced to find other sources from which to finance these services. Yet all of these forms of government assistance have been upheld." (citing, inter alia, Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968))).
263. 413 U.S. 734, 745 n.7 (1973).
264. Walz, 397 U.S. at 674. sarily violate the Establishment Clause. As the Court stated in Agostini, "Interaction between church and state is inevitable, and we have always tolerated some level of involvement between the two. "265 Rather, the church-state entanglement must be excessive in order to violate the Establishment Clause. 266 The Court has placed great em phasis on the frequency and extent of contact between the govern ment and the religious authority behind a school or institution of higher education in determining whether administrative entanglement is excessive. In Lemon, the Court found excessive entanglement where the possibility for diversion of government aid to religious indoctrina tion necessitated a "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance."267 Although the Court has subsequently rej ected the presumption that prompted the need for continuing surveillance in Lemon,2 68 this development leaves untouched the principle that suffi ciently intrusive surveillance is a form of excessive entanglement. Thus, the Court has approved of aid distributed in the form of a "one time, single-purpose" grant269 and aid distributed annually with only " 'quick and non-judgmental' " audits of a sectarian university's use of government aid. 270 The general extent of a state or municipality's entanglement with the religious authorities behind a pervasively sectarian institution is extremely limited, as the following description of a typical conduit is suance shows.271 The initial act in transactions such as those detailed in Lynn and Steele is the legislative creation of an agency (an "author ity") authorized to issue revenue bonds. 272 The borrowing party (the "entity") then approaches the authority with a proposed project seeking a revenue bond-funded loan to finance it.273 The authority ap proves the revenue bond issuance, sometimes after a public hearing274 or with independent approval of the issuance from a third party.275 A trustee is responsible for supervising the entity's adherence to the loan agreement, receiving payments from the entity, and representing the interests of bondholders.276 An underwriter purchases unsold bonds from the authority and subsequently resells them on the bond market to individual purchasers.277
The authority is not required to monitor the entity's compliance with the terms of the loan agreement and, moreover, is not obligated to ensure that the entity does not use secular aid for sectarian pur poses. Likewise, the authority plays no role in redistributing payments from the private entity to bondholders. The government's involvement therefore amounts to little more than the initial creation of the issuing authority and the subsequent approval of the transaction.278 This in volvement is far closer to that approved in Tilton than to the continu ing surveillance rej ected in Lemon.219
In assessing the degree of political entanglement, the essential question is whether the aid under consideration would lead to "politi cal division along religious lines."280 With revenue bond issuances such as those under consideration here, the Court is unlikely to reach such a finding. Colleges and universities have traditionally been subject to greater leniency in the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause juris-273. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 738 (describing the proposal submitted by Baptist College at Charleston to South Carolina's Educational Facilities Authority); Steele, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 694 (noting that Lipscomb University asked the industrial development board for a "$15 million, low-interest loan"); Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 688 (describing Regent University's applica tion to the Educational Facilities Authority).
274. See, e.g. , Steele, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 693 (noting that the industrial development board held two public hearings prior to approving Lipscomb University's proposal).
275. See, e.g., id. at 702-03 (describing the mayor's role in certifying that the proposed bond issuance would be exempt from fe deral taxation).
276. ROBERT LAMB, ET AL. THE HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL BONDS AND PUBLIC FINANCE 868 (1993) (defining "trustee").
277. See id. at 24.
278. The issuance in Hunt varied slightly from the transaction discussed in this Section. In Hunt, "the College would convey the project to ... the Authority, which would lease the property so conveyed to the College. After payment in full of the bonds, the project would be reconveyed to the College." Hunt, 413 U.S. at 738. Neither the Lynn nor Steele transac tions included this kind of conveyance.
279. See MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW, supra note 16, § 3.4.3 (applying the "exces sive entanglement" inquiry and concluding -even without considering the role of a trustee in supervising the beneficiary university in lieu of the conduit issuer -that the government's role "seems to entangle church and state no more than the planning that precedes direct grants of government funds to sectarian institutions, where the Supreme Court has approved the relationship"( citing Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976))). prudence than primary or secondary schools.281 In addition, the Court noted in Roemer the fact that "more than two-thirds" of private col leges have no religious affiliation, apparently reasoning that when the government extends aid to all private colleges, such aid will not give the impression that the government is promoting religious education in particular. 282
In the case of revenue bond issuances, moreover, a rule excluding consideration of an applicant's religious orientation is less likely to lead to "political division along religious lines"283 than a rule author izing the government to inquire into an applicant's religious affiliation. If a conduit issuer must bar institutions such as Lipscomb and Regent from participating in revenue bond financing, that authority would have to inquire into each applicant's religious affiliation, gauging the degree to which religion permeates a university's curriculum and as sessing the likelihood that secular aid would be diverted to religious purposes.284 Moreover, the Authority may have to conduct this inquiry in the context of a public hearing, a possibility that could produce the "political division along religious lines" that the Court envisioned with trepidation in Lemon.285 Even if state authorities were able to conduct such inquiry without bias, it is inevitable that rejection of an institu tion's proposal based on its religious affiliation would lead to litiga tion, as this determination would rest on a subjective characterization of the extent to which religion pervades an applicant's curriculum. In contrast, if state authorities issued revenue bonds without regard to a beneficiary's religious orientation, political division would be less likely because any applicant could make a proposal to an issuing authority without having to justify its religious -or secular -orien tation. Once the Court recognizes the participation of pervasively sec tarian institutions in such financing arrangements as in accord with the First Amendment, any litigation arising from an authority's approval of a revenue bond issuance is unlikely to center on the applicant's re ligious persuasion.
281. See, e.g. , Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 687-88 (1971) (plurality opinion) (rea soning that the "potential for divisive religious fragmentation" at a college or university is mitigated by the fact that a college or university is likely to have a diverse student body); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, § 12.2.6.3 (describing the Court's "more lenient" stance toward aid that benefits colleges and universities). (stating that, before approving a bond issuance, the industrial development board must determine that the bonds will advance a "legitimate public purpose" -a finding that would be impos sible if the issuance violated the Establishment Clause).
285. 403 U.S. at 622.
B.
Th Un ion.289 The underlying logic of the endorsement test is that the Es tablishment Clause prohibits the government from "appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community.' "290 When applying this test, the Court considers whether a particular government act has endorsed, favored, or promoted re ligion in general or a specific religious orientation.291 The Court views the government act under inquiry from the perspective of a "reason able observer,"292 asking whether the government has "discriminate [d] in fa vor of private religious ... activity. "293 While the Court has typically applied the endorsement test in the context of the placement of a physical display such as a creche on gov ernment property,294 it is possible to apply the test to a less tangible act such as the authorization df a revenue bond issuance.295 This analysis presents certain challenges in this more abstract context. As articu lated in Lynch and Allegheny, the endorsement analysis requires that a court consider the symbol constituting the would-be endorsement in context -its "physical setting" and "unique circumstances."296 In Steele, the District Court for the Middle District Of Tennessee applied this test by focusing on the Official Statement released pursuant to the issuance of revenue bonds.297 The court noted that the Official State ment "places the government's role first and then describes the uni versity, the project, and the uses of the funds provided through the bond proceeds,'' adding that the description of the university goes into the school's religious orientation in depth.298 Based on this review of the Official Statement, the court concluded that "[t]he structure and content of the Official Statement indicates to the reasonable observer that the Board ... is endorsing the sectarian beliefs and teachings of Lipscomb University. "299
Because the standard in Lynch and Allegheny requires that the court place the offending act or obj ect in its context and that the court view the would-be endorsement in its actual setting,300 Steele's en dorsement inquiry is inadequate for two reasons. First, an Official Statement's context is a proposed municipal bond issuance. Thus, this document has a particular reasonable observer as its intended audi ence: a prospective bond purchaser engaged in making an investment decision. Just as a reasonable observer in an art museum appreciates a religious work of art as art,301 a reasonable observer of an Official Statement must view this document as a solicitation for a financial transaction rather than a statement of the government's position con cerning religion. Second, the endorsement analysis should take into account that the Official Statement is one of a multitude of such documents released by the development authority. This conclusion follows from Justice O'Connor's art museum illustration in Lynch.302 Because a museum includes a variety of paintings of secular and re-296. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595 (plurality opinion) (quoting Lynch (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
297. 117 F. Supp. 2d at 733-34. 298. Id. at 733 (noting that the Official Statement provides: "As stated in its 1990-91 school catalog, the supreme purpose of the University is 'to teach the Bible as the revealed will of God to man and as the only and sufficient rule of faith and practice, and to train those who attend in a pure Bible Christianity' "). 
301
. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Although the religious and indeed sectarian significance of the creche, as the District Court found, is not neutralized by the setting, the overall holiday setting changes what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display -as a typical museum setting, though not neutralizing the religious content of a religious painting, negates any message of endorsement of that content. The display celebrates a public holiday, and no one contends that declaration of that holiday is understood to be an endorsement of religion.").
302. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
ligious content, a single religious painting does not convey a message of endorsement.303 A court applying the reasonable observer test to an official statement, therefore, must consider that document in its ,par ticular setting.304 A reasonable observer would have no reason to view any single official statement as a government endorsement of the re cipient university's religious orientation because the observer would be aware of issuances benefiting other universities with alternative re ligious and secular orientations.
An official statement is part of a complex financial transaction and, as such, a court applying the reasonable observer analysis must look beyond the pages of the official statement to the statutory authoriza tion for the transaction and the ensuing relationships between issuer, beneficiary, and trustee.305 In this context, a reasonable observer may view the bond issuance benefiting a pervasively sectarian university in the context of the legislature's desire to promote higher education,306 the neutral availability of revenue bond financing,307 and the govern ment's de minimis involvement in any given transaction.308 That this government aid is available and, in fact, utilized by institutions repre senting a wide variety of religious viewpoints should suggest to a rea sonable observer that the government does not endorse or favor the religion of any single participant. From this perspective, religion is wholly irrelevant.
In the final analysis, the endorsement analysis is satisfied only if an authority empowered to issue revenue bonds does not take an appli cant's religious orientation into account in determining whether to authorize a bond issuance. In concluding, as the district court did in Steele, that the authority must exclude certain applicants because of their religious beliefs and the extent to which these beliefs inform their actions in ostensibly secular affairs, the court would require the gov ernment to disfavor certain religious persuasions. This result makes an .) ) (stating that the board issuing reve nue bonds to Lipscomb University as powered "to approve tax-exempt bonds for various public works and projects, including 'any nonprofit educational institution in any manner related to or in furtherance of the educational purposes of such institution' " (alteration in original)).
307. See, e.g. , id.
308. See supra Section III. A. This Note has shown that not a single one of the legitimate dangers identified here by Professor Chemerinsky -neither compulsory sub sidization, nor endorsement, nor the intrusion of government into sec tarian activities -is present when pervasively sectarian institutions participate in conduit financing. The unique qualities of a revenue bond issuance -its neutral allocation of government aid, minimal contact between church and state, and absolute exclusion of public funds from aid to religious universities -obviate any genuine Estab lishment Clause concerns. Conduit financing, therefore, presents a special case of government aid to religious institutions that remains faithful to the "wall of separation"311 between church and state.
309. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593-94 (Blackmun, J.) ("Whether the key word is 'en dorsement,' 'favoritism,' or 'promotion,' the essential principle remains the same. The Es tablishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a posi tion on questions of religious belief or from 'making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community.'" (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
310. Chemerinsky, supra note 154, at 232.
311. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 n.1 (attributing the "wall of separation" metaphor to Thomas Jefferson).
